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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------~-------------
ELIZABETH A. DESCHLER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
FIREMAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corpor-
ation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18035 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff to compel the Defendant to 
pay accidental death benefits pursuant to a group insurance 
policy on the life of the Plaintiff's deceased husband. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The lower Court granted the Plantiff 's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds that the "water ski kite" is not a 
device for "aerial navigation" in that the skier "does not 
navigate" the device by use of air currents, but rather is 
controlled by the operator of the boat which pulls the kite. 
Judgment was entered on September 23, 1981. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks to have the lower Court's Judgment 
affirmed. 
QUESTION ON APPEAL 
Is a water ski kite "a device for aerial navigation" within 
the meaning of the accidental death insurance policy exclusion? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Robert w. Deschler was an experienced boatman, water skier, 
and water ski kite participant. He was killed in an accident at 
Starvation Reservoir on July 26, 1980, after the two rope was 
disconnected when gusts of wind carried him over the shore line 
where he landed and died. At the time of his death, he was 
insured under the Accidental Death Group Policy No. DVA 525-131, 
which had been issued to the State Employees Credit Union. 
At the time of his death, Robert w. Deschler was using a 
water ski kite. This device is used by water skiers who are 
raised into the air when sufficient air resistance is created by 
the boat pulling the participant and the kite at the end of a tow 
rope. When the tow rope is disconnected from the boat, the 
skier and the water kite immediately descends into the water. 
Water ski kites can be used only in calm weather. These 
recreational kites cannot be directed or controlled by the skier 
in wind or natural air currents as are airplanes, aerial para-
chutes or hang gliders. 
Darrel Brady, in his Affidavit (TR 54) stated: 
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" 4. That I have been using water ski kites for the last 
two years. In the course of my instruction and my 
experience, I have been made aware that water ski kites 
can be used only in connection with water ·skiing and 
being pulled by a boat. The only way that the water ski 
kite can be raised into the air is by the use of a rope 
two and the air resistance against the kite. " 
Brady further stated under oath that any attempt to use gusts 
of wind or air currents would be dangerous (TR-55): 
" 5. When the rope tow is disconnected from the. boat, 
the water ski kite immediately begins to descend. It is 
dangerous to attempt to have the water ski kite go in an 
upward direction because it would stall and fall to the 
water. Therefore, it is very important that when the 
water ski kite is disconnected that one immediately find 
a good place to land in the water. Water ski kites can-
not be used except on calm days because the kites cannot 
be controlled when there is a heavy breeze or gusty 
winds. The water ski kites cannot, on its own, be used 
to float in the air. If it were not for being pulled by 
a boat, water ski kites could not function at all." 
The testimony of Brady is corroborated by Ken Yocum, a man 
very skilled and experienced in the use of water ski kites. 
He said in his Affidavit: 
" 3. That water ski kites cannot be used over land but 
must always be used in conjunction with water skiing and 
a motor boat. 
4. That water ski kites cannot be operated on their 
own with the use of air currents. They must always be 
used in connection with a tow rope joined to a motor 
boat. Although the operator of a water ski kite can, 
with the use of the control bar and shifting body 
weight, cause the kite to move to the left or to the 
right, and up and down, to a limited degree, it becomes 
dangerous to have the water ski kite go too far to the 
left or to the right because it is easy to lose control 
of the kite. 
5. When the rope tow is disconnected from the boat, 
the water ski kite immediately begins to descend. It is 
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dangerous to attempt to have the water ski kite go in an 
upward direction because it would stall and fall to the 
water. Therefore, it is very important that when the 
water ski kite is disconnected that one immedia~ely find 
a good place to land in the water. Water ski kites can-
not be used except on calm days because the kites cannot 
be controlled when there is a heavy breeze or gusty 
winds. The water ski kite cannot, on its own, be used 
to float in the air. It if were not for being pulled by 
a boat, water ski kites could not function at all. " 
The decedent was proficient in the use of water ski kites and 
was well aware that they could be used only when pulled by a 
water boat on calm days. His wife, Elizabeth Deschler stated in 
her affidavit: 
" 5. In using the kite, it is essential that it be used 
in conjunction with a boat and a tow rope connecting the 
boat and the kite. Also, three persons are required to 
participate in this particular activity. One to drive 
the boat, one to serve as an observer and to hold the 
"quick release". which is used as a safety device to 
allow the kite to be disconnected from the boat in the 
event the person in the kite for some reason cannot 
disconnect the rope from the boat, and the third person 
is the person using the kite. 
6. During the course of receiving instructions, it is 
has been carefully pointed out and from experience 
proved to be true that the kite cannot be used or 
operated under any circumstance when the weather is 
windy. Even if there is a strong breeze, the kite can-
not be used because it is impossible to control. With 
no breeze or a little breeze, the one sitting in the 
kite, can hold the control bar with his hands and by 
sh if ting weight can move the kite to the right or the 
left. As long as the rope is connected, the kite can 
be controlled within the limits of the rope insofar as 
up and down movements are concerned. However, as soon 
as the rope is disconnected, the kite immediately begins 
to descend and the control of the flyer is limited to 
descending into the water. The one holding the kite 
cannot go up. Basically, the pressure against the wings 
created by the boat pulling the kite and the rider, give 
sufficient resistance to raise the kite and the rider 
into ~he air. Without the rope connected to the boat 
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and the kite, the kite functions like a parachute in that 
the one in the kite can, to a limited extent, control 
the downward descent. However, the flyer must always 
wear water skis and must land in the water. One of the 
reasons that you do not use the boat and kite in rough 
water or wind, is that the kite and the individual using 
the kite, may be blown onto the ground and be seriously 
injured and killed. " 
Subsequent to the death of Robert W. Deschler, his widow made 
application for the death benefits payable under the group 
insurance policy. The Defendant denied the Plaintiff's claim on 
the grounds of an exclusionary clause which reads: 
"The policy does not cover any loss, fatal or now fatal, 
caused by or resulting from (1) injuries sustained in 
consequence or riding as a passenger or otherwise in a 
vehicle or device for aerial navigation." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INSURANCE CONTRACT MUST BE CONSTRUED 
IN FAVOR OF INSURED IN THE EVENT 
OF AN AMBIGUITY 
Insurance carriers carefully prepare all of the provisions in 
their insurance policies. Historically, the companies draft the 
terms and conditions in a manner favorable to themselves. They 
use language that hopefully will give them the greatest proteG-
tion in the event questionable claims are filed against them. In 
the instant case, broad language " • ·a vehicle or device 
for aerial navigation •••• " was used. Therefore, under their 
broad interpretation, virtually anything that is airborne in any 
manner is "a device for aerial navigation." 
The Courts, realizing this propensity, have consistently 
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ruled that words and phrases used in insurance policies should be 
given their usual and ordinary meanings, and in the event of any 
ambiguity, the interpretation shall be in favor of the insured 
and against the insurer. 
In Bergera vs. Ideal National Insurance Company, 524 P.2d 
599, at page 600, the Court declared: 
"The policy is merely a contract between the insured and 
the insurer. Its language should be construed pursuant 
to the same rules as are applied to other ordinary 
contracts, to-wit: What did the parties thereto intend 
by the language used? Of course, any ambiguities will 
be construed against the insured, since the. policy was 
drawn by it. Words should be given their usual and 
ordinary accepted meaning." 
The Trial Court ruled that a water ski kite was "not 
navigated" by a pilot in the ordinary and usual sense as in the 
case of an airplane or hang glider because the operator of the 
motor boat really controlled the movements of the water skier, 
whereas, the usual aerial device is "navigated" fully by the 
pilot of the device and without the benefit of any external force 
or help. 
The following words and definitions were considered by the 
Trial Court in arriving at its decision: 
1. The Federal Aviation Agency in CFR 14:1.l defines kite 
and glider as follows: 
KITE: 
"A framework covered with papers, cloth, metal or other 
material, intended to be flown at the end of rope or 
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cable and having as its only support the force 
of the wind moving past its surface." (underlining for 
emphasis) 
GLIDER: 
"A heavier than air aircraft, that is supported in 
flight by the dynamic reaction of the air against its 
lifting surfaces and whose free flight does not depend 
principally on an engine." (underlining for emphasis) 
Although kites and gliders are not regulated by the Federal 
Aviation Agency, the definitions clearly demonstrate that persons 
associated with "aircraft" make definite distinctions between 
self-operating devices which are actually navigated and devices 
that are directed or controlled by an external force such as a 
rope tow and boat. The use of the term "free flight" in the 
definition of a glider is significant. The definition goes on to 
further point out that the glider "is supported in flight by the 
dynamic reaction of the air against its lifting surface." It is 
plain that the distinction is made between a device using the 
natural air currents to lift up the craft such as a glider or 
airplane, and a kite at the end of a rope which relies upon 
wind moving past its surfaces to remain in the air. 
as: 
as: 
2. "Aerial navigation" is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary 
"A branch of aerostatics which treats a floating in 
or navigating in the air as if in an airship or 
airplane." 
"Navigation" is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary 
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"The theory and practice of navigating, especially, 
the charting of a course for a ship or aircraft, • • • • 
the plan, record, and control of a course of a ship or 
aircraft • ~ •• to direct one towards a destination." 
It is submitted that using the above words and definitions a 
water ski kite is not a "vehicle or device for aerial 
navigation." In particular, the water skier does not control 
his direction or destination; the movement of the kite does not 
depend upon any dynamic teaction or natural air currents against 
its lifting surfacesr and the kite cannot in any sense of the 
word be considered as being in "free flight". 
On the contrary, a water ski kite is a recreational device 
never contemplated to be included within the insurance definition 
of "a device for aerial navigation." The water ski kite is 
simply a sporting device which has been developed for boat 
recreation and not intended for free flight navigation. 
The intent that a kite is basically a water surface device is 
substantiated by the statements made in the Affidavits of Yocum 
and Brady where it is positively stated that: 
"The kite cannot be used except on calm days •• 
kites cannot be controlled when there is a heavy breeze 
or gusty winds •••• water ski kites cannot, on its 
own, be used to float in the air. If it were not for 
being pulled by a boat, water ski kites could not func-
tion at all." (Brady Affidavit TR 55) 
The restricted control over a kite by the water ski is 
further explained by Brady when he swears: 
"If one goes too far to the left or right, the kite will 
roll over causing a direct descent and possible injury. 
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Once the rope tow is disconnected, the kite descends 
directly downward. If there is any effort to cause the 
kite to go up after the rope has been released, the kite 
immediately stalls and falls directly to the water where 
one may be injured." 
Yocum in his Affidavit (TR 56) confirms the fact that a kite 
is not a free flying device. He says: 
" Al though the opera tor of water ski kite can, with 
the use of the control bar and shifting body weight, 
cause the kite to move to the left or to the right, and 
up and down to a limited degree, it becomes dangerous to 
have the water ski kite go too far to the left or to the 
right because it is easy to lose control of the kite." 
" 5. When the rope tow is disconnected from the 
boat, the water ski kite immediately begins to descend. 
It is dangerous to attempt to have the water ski kite go 
in an upward direction because it would stall and fall 
to the water." 
In giving ordinary, usual interpretation to the words used in 
the insurance policy, there can be no doubt that the intent of 
the "exclusionary clause" is to cover free flight type aerial 
devices and not devices that are directed and controlled from the 
ground as in the case of a water ski kite. ~o stretch the 
interpretation as requested by the insurance company is ine-
quitable and unreasonable. A water skier in using a kite would 
not in any way consider that he was not covered by an accidental 
insurance policy on the basis that a kite was an aircraft. Water 
skiers using kites recognize the limitations of the sporting 
device and govern their activity accordingly. In the instant 
case, unexpected and severe gus.ts of wind caught the kite when it 
was disconnected and caused the kite to be blown upon the shore 
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where Robert Deschler landed and was killed. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ACCIDENTAL 
DEATH BENEFITS IN THAT THE DEATH 
WAS COVERED UNDER THE GROUP INSURANCE 
POLICY 
~hre is no reported case involving a death claim arising out 
of a water ski kite accident. This is a case of first impression 
in Utah as perhaps all other jurisdictions. The Defendant-
Appellant argues that the cases involving hang gliders, airpla-
nes, and sport-type parachutes are analogous and therefore Court 
rulings in those cases are applicable. It is the contention of 
the Plaintiff-Respondent _that the reported cases are not analo-
gous in that they involve aerial devices that are all free flight 
type aircraft or device that rely entirely upon a pilot controll-
ing the device by use of natural air currents and are not in any 
way directed, controlled, or navigated by an external force. 
Mr. Deschler was an experienced water skier, who engaged in 
that activity with the use of a water ski kite. He had received 
extensive instruction from experts including Lynn Webb, a person 
who manufactured kites which the decedent himself used. In his 
Affidavit, the Defendant's primary witness, Webb, stated: 
" 7. Water skis are used in conjunction with the kite. 
The operator of the kite is towed by a polyethylene rope 
of approximately 250 to 300 feet in length by a power 
boat to the speed of at least twenty miles per hour." 
The Affidavit of Webb then goes on to point out that the 
general direction and destination of the water skier is 
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controlled by the motor boat operator. 
The case of Childress vs. Continental Casualty Company, 461 
Fed Supp 704 (D.C. La., 1978, affirmed, 578 Fed 2d 809, 1979) is 
one of the leading cases involving parachutes and air flight 
devices. The Court used the dictionary definitions to conclude 
that a parachute was not included in the aircraft exclusion of 
the insurance policy. That policy used language similar _to the 
instant case: 
"Injury sustained in consequence of riding, except as a 
passenger, and not ·as a pilot or crew member, in any 
vehicle or device for aerial navigation." · 
The Court determined that the decedent who died in a 
parachute fall was not acting as a pilot because it was a device 
incapable of being piloted. The basic issue raised was whether 
.or not the parachute was a device for aerial navigation. The 
Court stated on page 705: 
" • • • the type of parachute being used by the 
decedent was designed so that its wearer could 
control his descent with a great deal of 
precision." 
The insurance carrier argued that this parachute was a "device" 
for aerial navigation because it could by means of control, be 
turned, braked, stalled and directed by a user, and its rate of 
descent could be regulated. In the case now before the Court, it 
is established by the Affidavits of the Plaintiff, Elizabeth 
Deschler, Yocum and Brady, and the Affidavit of Lynn Webb in 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
behalf of the Defendant, that there was some control over which 
the user could direct the descent~ However, it is also clear 
that the water ski kite could not function as a hang glider and 
fly up and down with the use of the natural air currents. The 
disconnection of the tow rope causes an immediate descent. 
Therefore, it would appear that the Childress case is very simi-
lar to the instant case because the same question is raised, 
namely; "What is an aerial device?" 
Another important case re la ting to the use of parachutes is 
that of Fielder vs. Farmer's New World Life Insurance Company, 
435 Fed Supp 912 (C.D. Cal., 1977). This particular case 
involved a hang glider. The exclusionary clause in this par-
ticular case provided that death resulting from descent from any 
kind of air craft or from travel or· flight in any kind of 
aircraft in which the insured was acting as a pilot or member of 
a crew, would result in an exclusion. The decedent was deter-
mined by the Court to be a pilot. The Court, however, then went 
on to emphasize that the term "riding in" is not intended to 
include the use of a parachute. In other words, the Court 
distinguished the Childress case from the Fielder case by 
declaring that in the one instance, a hang glider operator was a 
pilot but with respect to the use of a parachute, the operator 
was not a pilot within the usual definition. Again, in the case 
now before the Court, it is the contention of the Plaintiff that 
an operator of a kite is not a pilot within the usual meaning of 
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a person who solely controls, navigates or directs a craft to a 
specific destination. 
The case of Cabell vs. World Service Life Insurance Company, 
599 s.w. 2d 652, involved the use of a device known as a para-
plane which was designed in a specific way so as to allow air 
to flow through the para-plane and cause it to move forward 
through the air at 20 miles per hour by virtue of its own 
aerodynamics. The para-plane was so designed as to allow the 
user to control the device with great accuracy in free flight. 
On page 652, the Court states: 
"A jumper could accurately steer the para-plane from his 
exit from an airplane to a designated point on the 
ground one to one and a half-miles away." 
In the instant case, the user of the water ski kite could not 
exercise such control over a long distance or period of time. 
The kite is not a free flight device capable of floating through 
the air by application of aerodynamic principles. Mr. Deschler, 
as any other kite operator, upon being released from the tow 
rope, would descend directly from the forty or fifty feet height 
directly to the water, and the control bar woud merely allow a 
limited control in the safe descent. A water ski kite is not 
designed or intended to be a device which makes possible free 
flight with the help of air currents during prolonged periods of 
time in the air. 
In the case of Clark vs. Lone Star Life Insurance Company, 
347 s.w. 2d (1980) the decedent was killed while sport 
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parachuting. In that particular case, the Court specifically 
ruled that a parachute could not be considered an aircraft and it 
stated: 
"A device designed to safely retard descent from an 
aircraft, but that parachutes themselves cannot be con-
sidered aircraft.: 
Although parachute cases are cited for the· purposes of def in-
ing the meaning of "aerial devices and navigation", it is not to 
be concluded that kites are like or similar to parachutes. Kites 
are even more removed from "aircraft devices" than parachutes 
because they are basically controlled by boat operators and the 
. use of tow ropes. There is no free flight or designed maneuvera-
bility as in the case of various types of parachutes., ·There is a 
split of authority as to whether or not a parachute in every case 
is or is not a "device for aerial navigation." Plaintiff submits 
that kites by their design, function and purpose are not and were 
never intended to be considered "aerial devices"~ 
The Defendant relies heavily upon the case of Fireman Fund 
vs. Long, 251 S.E. 2d, 133. This case involves a hang glider. 
The decedent practiced with the hang glider by jumping off a 
small cliff. After the deceased felt he had mastered the hang 
glider, he decided to have the hang glider pulled by a rope 
attached to the rear bumper of a van. When the rope was 
released, the hang glider crashed killing the decedent. 
Certainly, this hang glider accident is not similar to the 
use of a water ski kite that is designed to be pulled by a boat 
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and tow rope. There is no indication that the hang glider was 
designed to be pulled by a land vehicle. However, this case is 
important in pointing out the basic differences of various devi-
ces and the manner in which they are designed and used. The 
devices should not be used for purposes for which they are not 
designed. Water ski kites are not designed to be free flight 
devices; therefore, their recrerational use is limited to water 
recreation. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the insurance carriers who had the 
exclusionsary clause prepared, at no time ever conceived of or 
concerned themselves with boa ts, water, water skis, or water ski 
kites. Common sense dictates that the intention was to exclude 
pilots of airplanes and devices that were intended to be flown in 
the skies relying upon air currents and atmospheric conditions. 
Should the Court come to the rescue or the aid of an insurance 
company for the purpose of granting it greater protection because 
it did not fully and completely insulate itself from having to 
pay every claim submitted to it unless the insurer by its own 
generous and beneficent inclinations provides for coverage? 
The law is clear that ambiguities in insurance contracts 
should be construed in favor of the insured. The insured has 
paid th premium and is entitled to the benefits unless it is evi-
dent and clear that there is no coverage. 
Traditionally, insurers have demanded narrow construction 
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with respect to benefits and broad construction with respect to 
payments. It is incumbent upon the insurers to insert 
appropriate modifications in their contracts in response to 
societal changes rather than rely upon the Courts to grant them 
favorable interpretations. In that fashion, the insured can rely 
upon the fact that he has insurance coverage for which he has 
paid. 
In the instant case, there is no reasonable basis for the 
decedent or his beneficiaries to believe that there was not 
coverage while he was engaged in his water ski activities. The 
burden is upon the Defendant insurer to establish that the dece-
dent was not covered. Ordinary and usual word usage and the 
application of the limited case law available are supportive of 
the Plaintiff's contention that the Defendant has wrongfully 
refused to pay the death benefits under the Accidenta·l Death 
Group Policy, and the Plaintiff is entitled to prompt payment. 
RESPECTULLY SUBMITTED this j 7 day of February, 1982. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Elizabeth Deschler 
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